presumptively invalid.<\/strong><\/p>\nThe People have the burden to justify a warrantless search and seizure, Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 455, Williams, supra @1297, because warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively illegal. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 711, 725; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 119; Wilder v. Superior Court (l979) 92 Cal. App.3rd 90.) This bedrock 4th Amendment Constitutional doctrine rule emanates from the centuries-old hard fast rule that warrantless liberty infringements are \u201cper se unreasonable,\u201d
\nPeople v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 673 [internal cite and quotation marks omitted], unless the People can show the narrow exception which applies thereto. (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750.)<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, some bench officers erroneously start the suppression hearing with the default position that the warrantless intrusion complained of was reasonable unless and until the defense shows otherwise. But this is only true when the search is conducted pursuant to a presumptively valid search warrant. ([ A] search conducted under color of a warrant is not \u2018reasonable per se,\u2019 but may be unreasonable in the constitutional sense on a number of grounds (that the defendant would have an affirmative duty to show in the case of a search subject to a presumptively valid search warrant.\u201d (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal. 3rd 67, at p. 97).<\/p>\n
This application of the wrong rule creates a mindset that incorrectly places the burden upon the accused to show that his or her conduct was so normal that it did not raise any suspicion at all, and as such states the standard exactly backward.<\/p>\n
The People\u2019s burden must be carried, of course, with \u201cevidence\u201d (Penal Code \u00a71538.5(c)), which has the same meaning for suppression motions as for trials. (Hewitt v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3rd 923, 927, cited app. in People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 732-733.) There is no \u201cprobable cause\u201d exception to the Evidence Code, nor any \u201cjust to explain the officer\u2019s subsequent conduct\u201d exception: \u201cSubjective intentions [of the police officers\/government agents] play NO ROLE<\/strong> in … Fourth Amendment analysis.\u201d Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [emphasis added]. To say there is \u201cNO ROLE,\u201d should be obvious, but apparently, there has been
\nsome confusion. Even when police could rely on hearsay [a rule which we do not think survives the post-Prop 8 requirement for objective\/non-subjective evidence], there must be a lawful foundation for the evidence or statements beforehand. Probably cause, an objective standard must exist. People v. Pease (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 442, 446-448; Ojeda v. Superior Court (1970) 12
\nCal.App.3d 909, 920-921.<\/p>\nThe Harvey\/Madden rule, outlined in People v. Harvey, (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516, 523, requires authentication when an officer\u2019s observations are gleaned from an indirect source, such as a caller to dispatch which eventually is relayed to the officer. The party proffering the evidence must prove the source of the information justified the arrest. (People v. Ramirez, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548. 1553.)<\/p>\n
Mr. Smith objects to the admission of any hearsay evidence being admitted on the issues of \u2018reasonable suspicion’, or \u2018probable cause\u2019 when it is in the form of dispatch transmissions. Certainly, Mr. Smith objects to double hearsay of any non-police informants or 911 callers on the same grounds.<\/p>\n